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TAKING AIM AT HOSPITAL "DUMPING" OF
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PATIENTS: THE
COBRA STRIKES BACK
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, if you will, a seriously injured accident victim
lying in a hospital emergency room bleeding profusely. While
for many of us this scene conjures up images of kindly health
care professionals in white lab coats working frantically to treat
the unfortunate victim, for millions of Americans the harsh
reality is that they will not receive adequate treatment, nor any
at all. The fact is that in private hospitals, those who can pay
or can guarantee payment by a third party payor will receive
care while those thirty-five million Americans' who do not
have health insurance will, in all likelihood, receive a cursory
examination only to be "shipped off" to a county hospital.'
The concept just described is known politely as "patient trans-
fer." In not so polite conversation the same concept is known
© 1991 by John P. Halfpenny. All rights reserved.
1. See Dallek & Waxman, "Patient Dumping:" A Crsis in Emeigency Medical
Care for the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1413, 1413 (1986) (citing U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (1984)).
2. A review of the studies detailing the incidence of patient transfers, and
the type of individual most likely to be transferred, reveals that the majority of
transferred patients lacks health insurance.
A study at Highland General Hospital in Oakland, California, found
that of 458 patients transferred to the emergency department from
other hospitals, 63% had no insurance, 21% had Medicaid, 13% had
Medicare, and only 3% had private insurance. This study also present-
ed evidence that a disproportionately large number of transferred pa-
tients were minorities. A study of 1021 patients transferred from oth-
er hospitals to the emergency department of Parkland Memorial Hos-
pital in Dallas found that 77% of the transferred patients lacked
third-party coverage. A study from Cook County Hospital in Chicago
of 467 patients transferred to the emergency department from other
hospitals found that the transferred patients were predominantly black
or Hispanic (89%), were largely unemployed (81%), and were usually
transferred because they lacked adequate health insurance (87%).
Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping; Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations,
257 J. A.M.A 1500, 1500 (1987) (citations omitted).
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as "dumping."' In essence, dumping is the refusal of a hospi-
tal to care for an emergency patient based on that patient's
supposed inability to pay for treatment.4 By transferring an
indigent or uninsured person, the private hospital can shift the
cost burden of caring for the individual to a public hospital.
Widespread dumping, therefore, has had a tremendous nega-
tive economic impact on public sector hospitals.' In addition
3. The cases are replete with examples of patient dumping by private hospi-
tals. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(private hospital transferred an unstabilized, indigent, pregnant woman who was
experiencing labor pains and vaginal bleeding to a county hospital); DeBerry v.
Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. I1. 1990) (patient sought treat-
ment at defendant hospital's emergency department. The patient was treated but
released before the condition was stabilized. Two days later when the patient
finally was admitted to the hospital it was determined that the patient was suffer-
ing from spinal meningitis). In one particularly egregious case, an indigent, teen-
age, pregnant woman, in labor, was refused admission at the defendant hospital
after examination. The physician who examined her directed her to a hospital
approximately 200 miles away, and when queried about transportation to said
facility instructed the woman to make the journey in her boyfriend's 1976 Ford
Pinto. The good doctor additionally advised that she not speed. See Owens v.
Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990). In addition
to the aforementioned cases, numerous newspaper articles illustrate widespread
dumping of indigent patients by private hospitals' emergency departments. See, e.g.,
Gollner, Doctor "Dumped" Indigent Patient, State Panel 'old, L.A. Times, Mar. 29,
1990, at B3, col. 1 (Valley ed.); Gewertz, Lawsuit Blames Hospitals for Indigent Man's
Death, L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1990, at B3, col. I (San Diego County ed.); Blum,
Cox, Lavelle, Doctor Fined for Dumping Patient in Labot; NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14, 1989,
at 6.
4. "Patient dumping is the refusal of hospitals, usually private hospitals, to
treat patients in need of emergency care (many of them women in labor) because
of their inability to pay. Instead of receiving treatment the indigent, uninsured pa-
tient is turned away or shuffled across town to the nearest public hospital; the
latter practice is euphemistically referred to as an 'economic transfer.'" McClurg,
Your Money or Your Life: Inteipreting the Federal Act Against Patient Dumping 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 174 (1989) [hereinafter Your Money or Your Life].
Dumping has also been defined as "the denial of or limitation in the provision of
medical services to a patient for econornic reasons and the referral of that patient
elsewhere." Ansell & Schiff, supra note 2, at 1500. It has also been defined as
"the denial of emergency medical services or the premature transfer of one pa-
tient from one hospital to another because that person cannot guarantee payment.
Hospital administrators euphemistically have called this practice 'demarketing of
services' and 'transfers of patients for economic reasons.'" Enfield & Sklar, Patient
Dumping in the Hospital Emegency Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 13
AM. J.L. & MED. 561, 562 n.1 (citing Friedman, The "Dumping" Dilemma: The Poor
Are Always With Some of Us, HosP., Sept. 1, 1982, at 51). Dumping has also been
referred to as "economic triage." Id.
5. Drs. Ansell and Schiff have demonstrated and documented the economic
impact on public hospitals as a result of private hospitals refisal to treat indigent
patients. Ansell and Schiff report that:
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to the economic costs of patient transfer, there are the medical
costs to be considered. The medical consequences of dumping
are serious and even fatal. Studies done at Highland General
Hospital in Oakland, California, Parkland Memorial Hospital
in Dallas, Texas, and Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illi-
nois, have found that 32% of transferred patients' medical
conditions were jeopardized by transfer (Highland Study), 24%
of those patients transferred were not in a stabilized condition
at the time of the transfer (Cook County Study), and 22% of
the dumped patients' medical conditions were serious enough
to merit admission to the intensive care unit (Cook County
Study).6 Other medical costs of dumping include delay in re-
ceiving necessary medical treatment and a higher mortality
rate for those persons dumped.7
This comment will address the federal antidumping legisla-
tion-as embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("COBRA")-as well
as the California antidumping provisions. The purpose of this
comment is to compare and contrast the California and the
federal antidumping legislation with emphasis on the
definitional differences in these provisions relating to an
"emergency," a "stable patient" and a "transfer." Other areas
to be discussed include when a patient transfer is acceptable
and appropriate, and the liability of hospitals and doctors for
the improper transfer of a patient. Finally, this comment will
address some of the unresolved aspects of antidumping legisla-
tion such as an "implicit transfer" or "constructive dumping"
in which a hospital does not transfer a patient from its emer-
In Chicago, transfers to its emergency department of patients from
other hospitals who required medical and surgical care cost Cook
County Hospital an estimated $24.1 million in 1983 in uncompensat-
ed care. If the patients transferred to Cook County Hospital are rep-
resentative of the patients transferred to public hospitals nationwide,
the cost to public hospitals in the United States just of transferred
patients requiring medical and surgical care would be $1.04 billion
annually. This constitutes a direct shift of costs from the private
health sector to financially troubled public hospitals. This $1.04 billion
estimate of costs would be substantially higher if patients requiring
pediatric, obstetric-gynecologic, and psychiatric care were included.
Ansell & Schift supra note 2, at 1500 (citations omitted).
6. See generally Ansell & Schift supra note 2.
7. See Ansell & Schiff, supra note 2, at 1500 (citations omitted) ("In Chicago,
transferred patients requiring medical (i.e. nonsurgical) care had more than twice
the mortality rate of patients directly admitted to Cook County Hospital").
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gency room but instead "shuts down" to an ambulance carry-
ing the injured party from the scene of an accident and re-
routes the ambulance-a practice known as "diversion"-to
another hospital. The author will suggest various statutory
enactments that would deal with the aforementioned unre-
solved aspects of federal and state antidumping legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Reasons for Dumping
In these days of ever-increasing medical costs,' private
hospitals have been forced to become more competitive and
cost efficient.9 As the costs of providing quality health care
services skyrocketed during the past decade or so, hospitals
responded by undertaking actions which, although lessening
the hospitals' costs, can also result in violations of federal anti-
trust I° and antidumping laws. In order to reduce costs and
expenses, avoid the duplication of facilities, and promote effi-
ciency, hospitals have resorted to merging with other hospi-
tals,jI acquiring other hospitals,' 2 and establishing exclusive
contracts with physicians for such medical services as anesthe-
8. To illustrate the recent increases in the cost of medical care consider the
following figures:
Medicaid, the joint state and federal program designed to provide
care to certain groups of the poor, spent over $23 billion in 1980,
compared with $6.3 billion in 1972. The cost of a day in the hospital
has increased over 1000 percent since 1950. Health care costs have
increased from 7.8 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in
1978 to 10.8 percent of the GNP in 1983.
Enfield & Sklar, supa note 4, at 563 (citing Perkins, The Effects of Health Care Cost
Containment on the Poor. An Overview, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831 (1985)). Nation-
al health care costs in the last twenty years have increased from $50 billion annu-
ally to $500 billion annually. See Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 181
(citing Can You Afford to Get Sick?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 46).
9. Note, Peventing Patient Dumping: Shaipening the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1186, 1195 (1986) [hereinafter Preventing Patient Dumping].
10. Federal antitrust law consists of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1990)), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 18-27 (1990)), and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1990)).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Carillion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D.
Va. 1989), affrd without opinion, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), ceit. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1295 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
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sia and radiology.13 These cost-cutting measures, although of-
ten subjecting the hospital to increased antitrust scrutiny by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of
Justice, are to be applauded as valiant attempts by the health
care industry to control spiralling health care costs. However,
an unfortunate result of economic competitiveness in the
health care industry, and hospital efforts to contain costs, is
increased dumping of uninsured and underinsured persons.
The idea of hospitals as economically competitive entities
is a phenomenon of recent vintage. Historically, hospitals were
seen as "noncompetitive entities. "4 In the past, the structure
of the health care industry was thought to be noncompetitive
because "the demand for health care was independent of the
price of services ... [and] the activities of normal consum-
ers.""s In the past, because the demand for health care was
inelastic16 (or independent of the cost of the health care ser-
vices required) the health care industry was viewed as noncom-
petitive. 7 Recently, however, courts have recognized the com-
petitiveness in the hospital industry based on a realistic look at
how the industry actually operates, and have abandoned the
traditional view of hospitals as noncompetitive entities."8 Be-
13. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
14. Note, Defining the Relevant Market in Health Care Antitust Litigation: Hos-
pital Meigeis, 75 KY. L.J. 175, 177 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Defining the Relevant
Market].
15. Id. at 177 (footnote omitted).
16. "An inelastic demand is said to exist when a one percent increase in
price causes a less than one percent decrease in the quantity demanded. In
general, a consumer's demand is inelastic when it is not very sensitive to price
changes in either direction." Schramm & Renn, Hospital Me~gers, Market Concentra-
tion and the Heifindahl-Hiischman Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869, 883 n.3 4 (citation
omitted).
17. See Note, Defining the Relevant Market, supra note 14, at 177-78.
18. As noted, one result of this abandonment of the view of hospitals as
noncompetitive entities is increased antitrust scrutiny and enforcement in the
health care industry. While the scope of this comment is not broad enough to
accommodate an exhaustive review of the antitrust implications of the new "com-
petitiveness" among hospital, suffice it to say that presently "health care industries
are just as constrained by the antitrust laws as are other industries." Proger,
Antitrust Developments Affecting the Health Care Sectoi; 57 ANTITRUsT L.J. 315, 317
(1988). In fact, "[b]y rough count, five times as many health antitrust actions have
been brought since ... 1975 than during the previous 85 years of Sherman Act
history." Note, Defining the Relevant Market, supra note 14, at 178 n.16 (citing
Halper, The Health Care Industy and the Antitrtst Laws: Collision Couse, 49 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 17, 17 (1980)). Moreover, it is clear that the courts will continue to
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cause of changes in the structure of hospital reimbursement
and payment systems, and "consumer pressure to reduce the
escalating cost[s] of health care,"19 hospitals have been forced
to become more cost efficient, and, as a result, competition in
the industry has increased. In this climate of increasing eco-
nomic competitiveness, and cost awareness, providing health
care for those unable to pay is not only impractical, but also
"bad business."20 Thus now, more so than ever, hospitals are
likely to dump uninsured patients.1 In fact, "[a]nnually an
estimated 250,000 patients in need of emergency care are
transferred for economic reasons." 2 A myriad of reasons
have been postulated to explain these large numbers of
dumped patients. Among the most common are an increase in
the number of uninsured Americans and federal cost contain-
ment programs.
1. An Increase in the Number of Uninsured Americans
From 1979 to 1984, the number of uninsured Americans
under the age of sixty-five increased from 29 million to 35
million 23 due to dramatic reductions in Medicaid and Medi-
care,24 as well as employer-sponsored traditional insurance
plans. Accordingly, the number of poor covered by Medicaid
in 1984 was less than 40%, whereas in 1965 the number of
treat the health care industry the same as other industries in applying the anti-
trust laws. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burgett, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d
1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cept. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); United States v. Carillion
Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 892 F.2d
1042 (4th Cir. 1989); and Hospital Corp. of Am. v. 17TC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986).
19. Note, Hospital Antitrust: The Meiging Hospital and the Resulting Exposure to
Antitrst Meiger and Monopolization Laws, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 300, 303 n.23 (1984).
20. Pneventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1195.
21. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1193.
22. Waxman, Protecting Emesgency Room Patients: The Dumping Must Stop, 24
TRIAL 58 (1988) [hereinafter Protecting Emeigenty Room Patients] (citing Ansell &
Schifg supra note 2, at 1500).
23. "This dramatic increase is due, in part, to federal and state reductions in
the Medicaid program. Over one million people were cut from the Medicaid
program from 1981 to 1985." Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1193-94
(citing Dowell, Hill-Builon: The Unfulfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
153, 153 n.1 (1987)).
24. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1193.
698 [Vol. 31
1991] HOSPITAL DUMPING 699
poor covered was equal to 70%.5 This dramatic decrease in
Medicaid coverage has left millions of poor Americans without
any medical insurance whatsoever. In fact, between the years
1981 and 1985 over one million people were dropped from
the Medicaid program. 6 Medicaid now insures less than half
the Americans who live below the federal poverty line.27 Fur-
thermore, "[i]n some states, Medicaid coverage has deteriorat-
ed so badly that a family of four with an annual income of
more than $4,248 is no longer eligible for benefits."28
In addition to Medicare and Medicaid cutbacks, American
corporations and employers have scaled back on health care
expenditures for employees. This has been done by simply
denying health care coverage completely to certain employees
and by limiting coverage to Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMO's) 2 9  or Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO's).s°
25. Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 9, at 1194 (citing Reinhold, Treating
An Outbreak of Patient Dumping in Texas, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, § 4, at 4, col.
3.)
26. See Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 180.
27. See Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 180.
28. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 180 (citing Can You Affordl to Get
Sick, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 46).
29. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) are a kind of prepaid medical
insurance plan in which the HMO's assume a contractual obligation to assure the
delivery of health services to enrollees who pay a fixed premium. In so-called
'open panel' HMO's, physicians are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis, but the
total fees are limited by the amount of payments by subscribers. This plan alters
the incentive structure found in conventional insurance plans. In a conventional
plan, both the patient and the physician have an incentive to overconsume health
care services, the patient because he does not bear the full cost of the services
and the provider because his income rises as the patient's consumption rises. In
an HMO plan, the patient has an even greater incentive to overconsume because
there are no deductibles or co-insurance features. The provider, however, has an
incentive to underprovide, because once the premiums are paid, additional services
serve only to increase costs. The result is that HMO's offer a lower-cost option to
those willing to accept fewer services in return. Your Money or Your Life, supra
note 4, at 181 n.45 (citations omitted).
30. Under a PPO arrangement, the hospital or insurance company will pay
the expenses of patients who use particular health care providers, chosen by the
hospital or insurance company, in exchange for a fixed monthly fee. Under the
plan, if the health care consumer utilizes the services of a health care provider
who is not a "preferred provider" the consumer is forced to pay all, or part of,
the cost of the services. The intent of a PPO is to induce consumers to seek
health care services from the preferred providers. The effect of this arrangement
is that the preferred providers will receive more business, and thus in exchange
for the increase in business the preferred providers will agree to reduce their fees
for the services. Thus the PPO can pass along the savings to health care consum-
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
As one commentator has noted:
In 1984, traditional company insurance plans covered 96%
of American workers, allowing them to choose their
source of care and to get reimbursed for the costs. Today,
only 28% of workers are able to participate in such plans;
the rest have been forced to accept Health Maintenance
Organizations or Preferred Provider Organizations that re-
strict coverage or limit which doctors they can see.5 '
Consequently, private hospitals are unable to seek reimburse-
ment for emergency care tendered to these uninsured persons
and have increasingly resorted to patient dumping.32
2. Federal Cost Containment Programs
As cost containment programs of the federal government
have increased, so has the problem of patient dumping. Begin-
ning in 1983, the way in which Medicare was financed was
changed by Congress from a system reimbursing hospitals for
the "reasonable costs they incurred in providing medical care
to Medicare beneficiaries "' to a "prospective payment sys-
tem."34 Under this prospective payment system, the federal
government pays hospitals a fixed, predetermined sum for the
care provided to the Medicare patient based upon a classifica-
tion of the patient's treatment under "Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs)." 5
Thus, under this fixed payment system of Medicare reim-
bursement, "[i]f the hospital can care for the patient for less
than the fixed sum, it may keep the surplus as profits. If, how-
ever, the cost of care exceeds the fixed payment, the hospital
must absorb the additional cost." 6 It was hoped that this new
system of Medicare reimbursement would create greater hospi-
ers who are part of the plan. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. Mutual Hosp. Ins.,
Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986); See also Note, Ball Memorial HospitaL
Section 2 Shermnan Act Analysis in the Alternative Health Care Delivety Market, 14 AM.
J.L. & MED. 249, 250-51 (1988). For a more complete discussion of Preferred
Provider Organizations, see Comment, Prefered Provider Oganizations: Can Doctors
Do the Price-Fixing?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 733 (1984).
31. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 181 (footnotes omitted).
32. See Preventing Patient Dumping; supra note 9, at 1194.
33. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1194.
34. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1194.
35. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34, 728 (1984) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 405).
36. Preventing Patient Dumpin& supra note 9, at 1194.
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tal efficiency, and less waste of resources, by essentially reward-
ing the efficient hospital, which could keep the surplus, and
punishing the inefficient hospital, which would be forced to
absorb the loss. Although the merits of this sort of economic
incentive are open to debate, one thing is perfectly clear: As
hospitals became increasingly risk adverse with regard to ab-
sorbing the cost of Medicare patients, dumping increased. The
"incentive" created by the arguably ill-conceived DRG system
was to treat fewer Medicare patients. Consequently, as the
administrators and policy makers of many hospitals came to
regard "charity care as an inefficient giveaway,"" patient
dumping increased."s
In short, due to the changes in the Medicare reimburse-
ment system, consumer pressures to reduce the increasing
costs of medical treatment, and competition from low cost
alternatives to traditional in-hospital health care services (i.e.
free-standing urgent care centers which compete directly with
hospital emergency departments) hospitals have been forced,
in the words of one commentator, "to enter the arena of stra-
tegic planning." 9 A hospital's "strategic plan" generally boils
down to the hospital concentrating on ways to control its costs
and expenses, and strategies to maintain, or expand, its market
37. Preventing Patient Dnmping, supra note 9, at 1194.
38. In the medical literature regarding patient dumping, or economic transfer,
of the uninsured and underinsured, commentators have remarked that "[moral
and ethical guidelines to protect patients are being increasingly ignored by hospi-
tals given strong incentives to transfer the uninsured. At many private hospitals'
emergency departments, pressure is placed on physicians to refrain from admitting
uninsured patients." Ansell & Schiff, supra note 2, at 1501 (citing Bernard, Patient
Dumping: A Resident's First-Hand View, 34 NEW PHYSICIAN 23 (1985); Anderson,
Cawley, & Andrulis, The Evolution of A Public Hospital Transfer Policy, 2 METROPOLI-
TAN HOSP. 1 (1985)). In addition, "[a] patient's condition might even be misrepre-
sented in efforts to transfer them to a public hospital." Id. (citing Anderson,
Crawley, & Andrulis, The Evolution of A Public Hospital Transfer Policy, 2 METRO-
POLITAN HOsP. 1 (1985)). For discussion of a study of paticnt transfers to High-
land General Hospital in Oakland, California, see 1-immelstein, Woolbandler,
Harnly, Bader, Silber, Backer and Jones, Patient Transfer: Medical Practice as Social
T iage, 74 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 494 (1984).
39. Note, Hospital Antitrust: The Meiging Hospital and the Resulting Exposure to
Antitrust Merger and Monopolization Laws, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 300, 301-02 (1984).
"Strategic planning includes 'the systematic generation and analysis of information
on environmental trends, market needs, demands, competition and performance.'"
Id. at 302 n.15 (quoting Gregory & Klegon, The Value of Strategic Marketing to the
Hospital, HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1983, at 16).
1991]
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base.4" Furthermore, as part of the "strategic plan," hospitals
diversify to combat the "competition created by regulat[ory]
and economic pressures."41 If hospitals fail to diversify, and
fail to become more cost efficient, "many inefficient hospitals
may become insolvent."42 Another tragic result of "strategic
planning" is increased dumping of indigent emergency depart-
ment patients. This increase in patient dumping, brought on
by an increase in the number of uninsured Americans and the
DRG system, created the need for legislative action to combat
the phenomenon. Thus, the United States Congress and many
state legislatures responded with antidumping legislation.4 s In.
the next section of this comment an analysis of federal and
California anti-dumping legislation will be undertaken.
B. Legislative Attempts to Curb Patient Dumping
1. The Federal Response to Patient Dumping: COBRA
In 1985, the United States Congress enacted legislation
designed to protect emergency room patients from improper
and inappropriate transfers.44 The federal antidumping legis-
lation is contained in section 9121 of the Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, commonly known as
"COBRA."45 This legislation is intended to apply to emergen-
40. See id. at 302.
41. Id. "Diversification may take the form of expansion, consolidation, acquisi-
tions, and joint ventures." Id. (footnote omitted).
42. Id. (footnote omitted).
43. In addition to federal and state legislation prohibiting or limiting patient
transfers based on economic considerations, ethical guidelines exist which counsel
against patient dumping. For example, "[t]he Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals states that 'individuals shall be accorded impartial access to treatment
or accommodations that are available or medically indicated, regardless of race,
creed, sex, national origin, or sources of payment for care.'" Ansell & Schiff, supra
note 2, at 1502 (quoting Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accred-
itation Manual for Hospitals, at ix (1984)). Additionally, "[t]he emergency care
guidelines of the American College of Emergency Physicians states that 'emergency
care should be provided to all patients without regard to their ability to pay.'"
Ansell & Schiff, supra note 2, at 1502 (quoting American College of Emergency
Physicians, Emeigency Care Guidelines (Position Paper), 11 ANN. EMERG. MED. 222,
222-26 (1982)).
44. "The purpose of the Anti-Dumping Act is to end the national scandal, as
Senator Durenberger described it, of 'rejecting indigent patients in life threatening
situations for economic reasons alone.'" Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp.
Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting 131 CONG. REC. S13903
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985)).
45. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 1921, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (codified as amended at
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cy medical conditions and women in the final stages of child-
birth.46
In essence, COBRA requires participating Medicare hospi-
tals, which staff an emergency room, to examine all individu-
als, regardless of whether that person is eligible for Medicare
benefits, to determine if a medical emergency exists. 47 If a
medical emergency does exist, the hospital is required to stabi-
lize the emergency condition.4" Under COBRA, a hospital is
not necessarily prohibited from transferring an emergency
department patient, but rather is required to restrict the trans-
fer until the individual's condition has been stabilized. 49 Fur-
thermore, COBRA states that a transfer of a stabilized emer-
gency department patient may not be made unless the individ-
ual or the individual's guardian requests the transfer," or a
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
COBRA is not the first federal legislative response to the problem of
dumping of uninsured patients by private hospitals. Rather, Congress' first attempt
to force private hospitals to treat uninsured emergency department patients is
found in the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1988). The Hill-Burton Act, enact-
ed in 1946, was not primarily concerned with the problem of patient dumping,
but instead was enacted to provide federal money to aid states in the construction
of new hospitals and the modernization of older facilities. See Preventing Patient
Dumping. supra note 9, at 1198. In return for this federal assistance, the
Hill-Burton Act required participating hospitals to "provide, for a twenty year
period, a reasonable volume of free or below-cost care to any person tnable to
pay." Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1198 (footnote omitted). Howev-
er, the Hill-Burton Act, because of lack of enforcement by the Department of
Health and Human Services and deficiencies in the statute's penalty and definition
sections, was ineffective in checking the flow of uninsured or indigent patients
transferred from private hospitals' emergency departments. In response to the
failure of Hill-Burton, Congress in 1986 enacted the antidumping provisions of
COBRA. For a more detailed analysis of the Hill-Burton Act and its failure to
protect the uninsured emergency department patient, see Dowell, Hill-Builon: The
Unfulfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 153 (1987); Preventing Patient
Dumping supra note 9, at 1198-1201.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
47. See id. § 1395cd(a) ("In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emer-
gency department, if any individual (whether or not eligible for ... [Medicare
benefits]) comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the
individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the
hospital must provide for an appropriate inedical screening examination ... to
determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.").
48. Id. § 1395ddl(b)(1)(A) ("If any individual . . . conies to a hospital and the
hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition, the
hospital must provide ... for stuch further medical examination and such treat-
ment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition ... .
49. See id. § 1395dd(c).
50.
If an individual at a hospital has all emergency inedical condition
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physician determines that "the medical benefits reasonably
expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment
at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the
individual... from effecting the transfer."5
COBRA further states that an appropriate transfer is one
in which the receiving medical facility "has available space and
qualified personnel for the treatment of the individual,"52 and
"has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide
appropriate medical treatment."-3  Moreover, COBRA re-
quires that the transferring hospital provide the receiving hos-
pital with all of the transferred patient's medical records.54
COBRA also requires that the patient transfer be effectuated
by qualified medical personnel employing medically appropri-
ate standards of transfer.
55
a. Enforcement of Federal Antidumping Legislation
Enforcement of the federal antidumping legislation is im-
plemented in three ways: (1) through a suspension or revoca-
which has not been stabilized.., the hospital may not transfer tile
individual unless-
(A)(i) the individual (or a legally responsible individual acting
on the patient's behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obliga-
tions under this section and of the risks of transfer, in writing re-
quests transfer to another medical facility.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).
52. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B)(i).
53. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B)(ii).
54.
An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer-
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all
medical records (or copies thereof) related to the condition for which
the individual was presented, available at the time of the transfer,
including records related to the individual's emergency medical condi-
tion, observations of signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, treat-
ment provided, results of any tests and the informed written consent
or certification (or copy thereof) . . . and the name and address of
any on-call physician . . . who has refused or failed to appear within
a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing treatment.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(C).
55. "An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer-
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and
transportation equipment, as required, including the use of necessary and medical-
ly appropriate life support measures (luring the transfer . . . ." Id.
§ 1395dd(c)(2)(D).
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tion of a hospital's Medicare provider agreement;56  (2)
through civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 imposed on
offending hospitals or doctors;57 and (3) by allowing private
individuals who suffer harm due to an improper transfer to
bring a civil suit against an offending hospital.5"
1) Revocation or Suspension of a Hospital's Medicare
Provider Agreement
As previously noted, COBRA does not apply to all hospi-
tals, but rather only to hospitals that have emergency depart-
ments and are participants in the Medicare reimbursement
program. 9 However, since "[n]inety-eight percent of the hos-
pitals in this country participate in the Medicare program"60
COBRA in essence, if not on its face, applies to all hospitals
which staff emergency departments.
Thus, a very effective enforcement tool of COBRA is the
revocation or termination of a hospital's Medicare provider
agreement," or a suspension thereof,6" for any hospital that
56. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1).
57. See id. § 1395dd(d)(2).
58. See id. § 1395dd(d)(3).
Also note that COBRA provides that
[a]ny medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct result of
a participating hospital's violation of a reqtiremen of [COBRA] . . .
may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those
damages av,'ailable for financial loss, under the law of the state in
which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropri-
ate.
Id. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B).
59. Id. § 1395dd(a)(1).
60. Your Money or Your Lfre, supra note 4, at 199, n.112 (citing Health Care
Financing Admin., Bureau of Management and Strategy, HCFA Statistics 13
(1986)). As of 1986, the year of COBRA's adoption, there were 6,941 hospitals in
the United States registered with the American Hospital Association. See Preventing
Patient Dumping supna note 9, at 1188 n.19 (citing American Hosp. Ass'n, Hospital
Statistics vii (1986)). Of these 6,941 hospitals, 6,710 participate in the federally
funded Medicare reimbursement scheme. Id. at 1188 n.19 (citing Health Care
Financing Admin., Bureau of Management & Strategy, HCFA Statistics 13 (1986)).
Thus, 6,710 out of 6,941 or 98% of American Hospitals participate in the Medi-
care program.
61. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (1988). ("If a hospital knowingly and willfully, or
negligently, fails to meet the reqtuirements of [COBRA] . . . such hospital is sub-
ject to . . . termination of its [Medicare] provider agreement .... ").
62. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) ("If a hospital knowingly and willfilly, or neg-
ligently, fails to meet the requirements of [COBRA] . . . such hospital is subject
to . . . , at the option of the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human
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violates the COBRA requirements. Furthermore, a hospital is
subject to termination or suspension of its Medicare provider
agreement for all "knowing, willful or negligent" violations of
COBRA.6 s
Although the revocation or suspension of a hospital's
Medicare provider agreement is an effective method of enforc-
ing COBRA, its draconian approach can be likened somewhat
to "throwing out the baby with the bath water" for two rea-
sons. First, since "approximately forty percent of [a] participat-
ing hospital['s] revenues come from the Medicare Program, "64
cutting off a hospital's Medicare funding could drive some
hospitals out of business and into bankruptcy. Although this
would eliminate the problem of dumping, it could also have
the effect of depriving single-hospital rural communities of any
health care. While the author has not found a single case of a
hospital having its Medicare funding revoked due to patient
dumping,65 COBRA clearly states that this is a possibility, no
matter how remote. 66 Because of this very real possibility, the
author would propose an amendment to the enforcement pro-
visions of COBRA limiting this remedy to repeated, willful and
knowing violations of the Act. As the legislation now stands, a
single act of negligence on the part of a hospital could result
Services], suspension of such [Medicare provider] agreement for such period of
time as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, upon reasonable notice to the
hospital and to the public.").
63. Id. § 1395dd(d)(l).
COBRA also provides that a physician upon whom a civil monetary penalty
is imposed may also be subject to having his or her Medicare piarticipation termi-
nated or suspended. A discussion of this possibility will be undertaken in a discus-
sion of physicians' liability to civil monetary penalties.
64. Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 9, at 1217 (citing Vladeck, Medical
Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 576,
576 (1984)).
65. "Federal enforcement of COBRA has been lax. Despite estimates of
250,000 dumped patients per year, as of January 1, 1988, the Department of
Health & Human Services (HI-IS) had imposed monetary penalties against only
two hospitals and never had suspended a hospital from Medicare participation."
Your Money or Your Lfre, supm note 4, at 200.
66. Research revealed only one incidence of a hospital threatened with revo-
cation of its Medicare reimbursement as a result of noncompliance with COBRA's
antidumping provisions. This hospital was Brookside Hospital located in San
Pablo, California. See Enfield & Sklar, supra note 4, at 590 n.141 (1988) (citing
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1987, at A17, col. 1.). However, the hospital never lost its
Medicare funding as the Health Care Financing Administration never carried out
its threat. Id. at 590 n.141 (citing MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 24, 1987, at 24.).
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in a revocation of its Medicare funding.
A second problem with the provision for revocation or
suspension of a hospital's Medicare funding is that "it would
also mean that Medicare patients [would be] denied access to
that hospital."6 7 Congressional intent in enacting COBRA's
antidumping provisions was to insure that indigent patients
would receive proper emergency care."8 However, this intent
could be thwarted entirely if a hospital has its Medicare fund-,
ing revoked, thus depriving Medicare patients of medical treat-
ment.
2) Civil Monetary Penalties
a) Hospital
Further enforcement of COBRA's antidumping regula-
tions is effected through the imposition of civil fines of up to
$50,000 for each violation by a participating Medicare hospi-
tal. 9 However, these fines will be levied only against hospitals
that "knowingly" violate COBRA's requirements. 7° This en-
forcement tool is better suited to achieving the congressional
intent of preventing patient dumping while providing medical
care for the indigent than revocation or suspension of a Medi-
care provider agreement. As previously illustrated, revocation
of the Medicare provider agreement could drive a hospital out
of business. While a civil penalty of $50,000 on a hospital
could have a harsh economic effect, it is seriously doubted that
it could wreak as much havoc as a deprivation of up to forty
percent of a hospital's revenues. 71
Notwithstanding the greater damage to a hospital caused
by a revocation of its Medicare provider agreement, this means
67. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1217 (footnote omitted).
68. "The psrpose of the Anti-Dumping Act is to end the national scandal, as
Senator Durenberger described it, of 'rejecting indigent paitients in life threatening
situations for economic reasons alone.'" Owens v. Nacogdoclhes County Hosp.
Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting 131 CONG. REC. at
S13903 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985)).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1988).
70. "A participating hospital that knowingly violates a requirement [of CO-
BRA] . . . is subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each violation." Id. (emphasis added).
71. "Approximately forty percent of a participating hospital's revenues come
from the Medicare Program." Preventing Patient Dumpin& supra note 9, at 1217
(citation omitted).
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of enforcement is permitted upon a lesser standard of liability
than that for imposition of civil monetary penalties. As incredi-
ble as it may seem, a hospital can theoretically lose its Medi-
care provider agreement (and thus in all likelihood a large
share of its revenues) merely on the negligent failure to meet
COBRA's requirements, whereas the imposition of a civil mon-
etary fine cannot occur unless a hospital commits a "knowing"
violation of COBRA.72  This makes absolutely no sense
whatsoever, and it seems reasonable that Congress consider
amending COBRA so that civil monetary fines could be levied
for negligence" (as a way of further attaining hospital compli-
ance with the regulations) and, more importantly, making the
revocation or suspension of Medicare funding dependent on
knowing or willful repeated violations.74
b) Physicians
Civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 can also be im-
posed upon a physician knowingly responsible for the
hospital's violation of COBRA's antidumping provisions."m
COBRA further provides that an on-call physician who
fails or refuses to come to the hospital to treat an uninsured
emergency department patient shall be liable for a civil mone-
tary fine of up to $50,000. However, if the emergency depart-
ment physician transfers the patient because of the on-call
physician's refusal to treat the uninsured patient, the transfer-
ring physician shall not be liable.76
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1988).
73. The author's proposed amendment to COBRA, lessening tile standard for
imposition of a eivil monetary fine against an offending hospital to a negligence
standard, can be found in the proposal section of this comment.
74. For an argument that regulations should be promulgated clarifying and
enumerating proper circumstances for the termination or suspension of a
hospital's Medicare funding, see Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1217.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1988) ("[A]ny physician who is responsi-
ble for the examination, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating
hospital, including a physician on-call for the care of such an individual and who
knowingly violates a requirement of this section . . . is subject to a civil monetary
penalty of not more than $50,000 for each such violauion . . ").
76. See id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) ("If, after an initial examination, a physician
determines that the individual requires the services of a physician listed by the
hospital on its list of on-call physicians . . . and notifies the on-call physician and
the on-call physician fails or refuses to appear within a reasonable period of time,
and the physician orders the transfer of the individual because the physician
708 [Vol. 31
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The imposition of a civil monetary penalty on a physician
who violates the provisions of COBRA now rests upon a find-
ing that the physician knowingly violated the Act. This standard
should be lowered to negligence to ensure greater compliance
with COBRA.
3) Civil Enforcement
As a further means of compelling compliance by hospitals
with the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, COBRA provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result
of a participating hospital's violation of [COBRA] ... may,
in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain
those damages available for personal injury under the law
of the state in which the hospital is located, and such equi-
table relief as is appropriate.77
COBRA does not, however, create a right of private action
against the physician who violates the statute, but in the opin-
ion of the author, it should. California law does provide for
civil suits against doctors.7 s It should also be noted that in
one of the first cases alleging COBRA violations in which an
opinion was recorded, Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hospital,79 the
court determined that COBRA provides for a "Federal cause
of action." ° Thus, a person who suffered harm as a result of
a violation of COBRA could bring suit in either a federal court
under federal subject matter jurisdiction or in a state court.
COBRA also provides:
Any medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct
determines that without the services of the on-call physician the benefits of trans-
fer outweigh the risks of transfer, the physician authorizing the transfer shall not
be subject to a [civil monetary] penalty .... However, the previous sentence
shall not apply to the hospital or to the on-call physician who failed or refused to
appear.").
77. Id. § 1395ddl(d)(3)(A).
78. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(0 (West Supp. 1989).
79. 689 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Penn. 1988).
80. Id. at 493. Accord, Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131
(6th Cir. 1990); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Reid v. India-
napolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 854 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 1989);
Sorrells v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. I1. 1990); Owens v. Nacogdoches
County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Thompson v. St.
Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ili. 1989).
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result of a participating hospital's violation of [CO-
BRA] ... may, in a civil action against the participating
hospital, obtain those damages available for financial loss,
under the law of the state in which the hospital is located,
and such equitable relief as is appropriate.8 '
This provision of the federal antidumping law is very impor-
tant because one study of dumping that occurred before the
enactment of COBRA found that generally the public hospital
receiving the transferred patient was only partly compensated
for the patient's care by the private, transferring hospital. 82
This study found that the hospital charges for care that were
documented in 240 of 243 cases transferred to the public hos-
pital by private hospitals for economic reasons, the costs were
in excess of $380,000.83 Of this $380,000 in medical expenses,
the public hospital recovered less than $60,000.4 Thus, in
this study alone, private hospitals shifted the economic burden
of caring for indigent patients to the public hospital in the
amount of $320,000 of uncompensated medical care.85 Per-
haps the most interesting aspect of the COBRA provisions for
civil actions by individuals and medical facilities harmed by a
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(C) (1988).
82. See Kellermann & Hackman, Emeigenty Department Patient "Dumping:" An
Analysis of Intet-hospital Transfeis to the Regional Medical Center at Memphis, Tennessee,
78 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1287 (1988).
83. See id. at 1289.
84. See id. The following chart demonstrates the cost of the uncompensated
care provided to persons transferred to the public hospital's emergency depart-
ment:
Total Uncomp.
Payor N % Charges Collections* Care
Medicare 9 3.8 81,456 49,832 31,624
Medicaid 49 20.4 17,192 5,711 11,481
Private Ins. 15 6.3 28,602 2,261 26,341
Self-pay 167 69.5 254,523 1,868 252,655
Total 240 100.0 381,773 59,672 322,101
* Receipts 6 months following Emergency Department visit and/or subsequent
hospitalization.
Soure: Kellermann & Hackman, supra note 82, at 1290, TABLE 2.
85. See id. Interestingly enough, at one point during this study, due to hospi-
tal overcrowding as a result of accepting so many dumped patients, the public
hospital was forced to transfer out 12 patients to area private hospitals. The
recipient private hospitals in this situation "required promise of payment from 3rd
party payors or the [public hospital] before accepting any of these patients in
transfer." Id. at 1289.
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hospital's violation of the statute is the fact that COBRA does
not state upon what basis the hospital's liability is assessed. In
the words of one commentator, the level of liability required
by the COBRA provision "creat[ing] the private right of ac-
tions against hospitals appear[s] to be strict liability."86 Be-
cause the statute fails to state the grounds upon which liability
will be assessed, "recovery ... requires proof only of a viola-
tion, causation, and damages."" The statute by its very terms
does not state upon what basis liability will be imposed in civil
enforcement actions. Although, as a general principle, courts
will not interpret statutes as imposing strict liability unless
there is a clear legislative purpose to do so,8 8 two recent fed-
eral courts in interpreting COBRA's civil enforcement provi-
sions have found that the standard upon which liability is to be
based is strict liability.8" Although neither federal court en-
gaged in any substantial discussion regarding a finding of a
clear legislative purpose to impose strict liability in civil en-
forcement actions brought under COBRA, ostensibly the legis-
lative purpose of deterring patient dumping and compensating
victims was enough to convince these courts that the liability
basis for civil enforcement actions was strict liability.
b. The California Response to Patient Dumping
The California legislation concerning a hospital's obliga-
tion to provide emergency care and a hospital's obligation not
to transfer emergency room patients unless certain specified
criteria are met is one of the most extensive of such statutes
enacted by any state. California law requires a hospital to pro-
vide emergency care to anyone requesting such care for "any
86. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 207.
87. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 207.
Although a complete discussion of the impact of a strict liability cause of
action is beyond the scope of this paper, for a further treatment of the subject
(as well as negligence per se with regard to civil causes of action for COBRA
violations), see Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 207-14. See also Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
88. See Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 207 (citing W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE Lw OF TORTS, 228
(5th ed.. 1984)).
89. See Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 1990 U.S. App.
(LEXIS 20865) (10th Cir. 1990) ("We construe this statute as imposing a strict
liability standard .... "); Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855 ("[T]he federal antidumping
statute was based on a strict liability standard.").
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condition in which the person is in danger of loss of life, or
serious injury or illness, at any health care facility ... that
maintains and operates an emergency department to provide
emergency services to the public." ° Furthermore, California
law requires that a hospital which maintains an emergency
department shall not withhold emergency care from anyone
requesting it based on that person's "race, ethnicity, religion,
national origin, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting medical condi-
tion, physical or medical handicap, insurance status, economic
status or ability to pay for medical services."9' However, nei-
ther a hospital nor health care provider will be held liable for
refusing to provide emergency care where an emergency medi-
cal condition is determined not to exist,92 or where "the
health care facility does not have the appropriate facilities or
qualified personnel available to render those services." 3
In enacting this legislation regarding emergency care, the
California legislature also intended to reduce the incidence of
patient dumping by private hospitals. Although not entirely
barring a hospital or physician from transferring an emergency
care patient, the legislature imposed strict conditions which
must be met in order for a transfer to be effected. The legisla-
ture determined that before a transfer may be made, the per-
son must be examined by a physician," a physician must de-
termine that the transfer will not "create a medical hazard to
the person;"95 and finally, a doctor at the transferring hospital
must notify a doctor at the receiving hospital and obtain the
consent of the doctor at the receiving hospital to receive the patient.'
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317(a) (West Supp. 1989).
91. Id. § 1317(b).
92. Id. § 1317(c) ("Neither the health facility, its employees, nor any physi-
cian . . . shall be liable in any action arising out of a refusal to render emergency
services or care if the refusal is based on the determination, exercising reasonable
care, that the person is not suffering from an emergency medical condi-
tion . . ").
93. Id.
94. Id. § 1317.2(a) ("No person needing emergency services arid care may be
transferred from a hospital to another hospital for any nonmedical reason (such
as the person's inability to pay for any emergency service or care) unless . . . (a)
[t]he person is examined and evaluated by a physician ... prior to trans-
fer .... ")
95. Id. § 1317.2(b).
96. See id. § 1317.2(c) ("No person needing emergency services and care may
be transferred from a hospital to another hospital for any nonmedical reason
(such as the person's inability to pay for any emergency service or care) un-
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The California legislation applies to all hospitals operating
within the state. The statute holds that, as a condition of licen-
sure, all hospitals in California must adopt transfer proto-
cols, 9 7 and a policy prohibiting discrimination in the render-
ing of emergency care. 8 Furthermore, as a condition of licen-
sure, hospitals must require that physicians who serve "on-call"
in the emergency department not refuse to respond to a call
for discriminatory reasons, or because of a patient's inability to
pay.99
less . . . (c) [a] physician at the transferring hospital has notified and has ob-
tained the consent to the transfer by a physician at the receiving hospital . . ").
97. "As a condition . . . of licensure, each hospital shall adopt, in consulta-
tion with the medical staff, policies and transfer protocols consistent with this
article and staff regulations adopted hereunder." Id. § 1317.3(a).
98.
As a condition of licensure, each hospital shall adopt a policy prohib-
iting discrimination in tile provision of emergency services and care
based on race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, sex,
preexisting medical condition, physical or mental handicap, insurance
status, economic status, or ability to pay for medical services, except
to the extent that a circumstance such as age, sex, preexisting medical
condition, or physical or mental handicap is medically significant to
the provision of appropriate medical care to tile patient.
Id. § 1317.3(b).
99.
As a condition . . . of licensure, each hospital shall require that physi-
cians who serve on an 'on-call' basis to the hospital's emergency room
cannot refuse to respond to a call on the basis of the patient's race,
ethnicity, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting
medical condition, physical or mental handicap, insurance status, eco-
nomic status, or ability to pay for medical services, except to the
extent that a circumstance such as age, sex, preexisting medical condi-
tion, or physical or mental handicap is medically significant to the
provision of appropriate medical care to the patient.
Id. § 1317.3(c).
Note that the California legislation is broader in this respect than the feder-
al act. The federal act does not require that "on-call" emergency departnent physi-
cians respond regardless of the patient's ability to pay. The federal act only re-
quires that hospitals wishing to participate in the Medicare program "maintain a
list of physicians who are on call for duty after the initial examination to provide
treatment necessary to stabilize an individual with an cinergency medical condi-
tion." 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(l)(iii) (1988). However, if an oji-call physician refus-
es or fails to respond to the emergency situation and the patient is dumped, the
on-call physician is subject to a fine of up to $50,000. See id. § 1395(d)(2)(C). For
discussion of a proposed amendment to the federal act which would have explicit-
ly required an on-call physician to respond to emergency situations regardless of
the patient's ability to pay, see Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 207.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
1) Enforcement of California Antidumping Legislation
California antidumping legislation provides for four means
of enforcement. Under California law, violators of the
antidumping statute are subject to a revocation or suspension
of their emergency medical services permit,100 criminal liabili-
ty,101 civil monetary penalties, 02 and private civil suits"'
brought by those who have been harmed by dumping. Each of
these means of enforcement will be discussed below.
a) Revocation or Suspension of a Hospital's
Emergency Medical Services Permit
California law provides that "[a]ny hospital found by the
state department ... to have committed a violation of [the
antidumping legislation] ... may have its emergency medical
services permit revoked or suspended by the state depart-
ment."' °4 All alleged violations of the California antidumping
legislation "shall be investigated by the state department. "' 05
Also, "the state department, with the agreement of the local
EMS [Emergency Medical Services] Agency, may refer viola-
tions ... to the local EMS agency for investigation."'0 6
Therefore, a California hospital that violates the statute is sub-
ject to losing its EMS permit and thus would be forced to close
its emergency department.
Under California law, if either the State Department or
EMS agency, in their investigation of a hospital's alleged vio-
lation of the antidumping legislation, discover an alleged viola-
tion by a physician, they are required to report this violation to
the board of medical quality assurance.0 7
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(b) (West Supp. 1989).
101. See id. § 1317.6(c).
102. See id. § 1317.6(a).
103. See id. § 1317.6(o.
104. Id § 1317.6(b).
105. Id. § 1317.5(a).
106. Id.
107. "At the conclusion .. .of its investigation [of a hospital for .iolations]
the state department or the local EMS agency shall refer any alleged iolation by
a physician to the board of medical quality assurance unless it is determined that
the complaint is without a reasonable basis." Id. § 1317.5(b).
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b) Criminal Liability
The federal antidumping legislation, as embodied in CO-
BRA, contains no provision for the imposition of criminal lia-
bility. The California legislation is broader than the federal
approach in this regard and holds that "[a]ny administrative or
medical personnel who knowingly and intentionally violates
any provision [of the antidumping legislation] may be charged
by the local district attorney with a misdemeanor."' 0
c) Civil Monetay Penalties
(1) Hospital Liability for Civil Monetary
Penalties
Like COBRA, California law provides for the imposition
of fines upon hospitals that have violated the antidumping
legislation. Whereas, under federal legislation, hospitals that
have violated COBRA are liable in civil monetary penalties of
up to $50,000,'0° California legislation provides for fines not
exceeding $25,000.11°
The California legislation also sets forth the provision that
the state department should take into account several factors
in determining the amount of the fine. Such factors include
"[w]hether the violation was knowing or unintentional,"
1 1
"[w]hether the violation resulted, or was reasonably likely to re-
sult, in a medical hazard to the patient, '112 and "[t]he frequen-
cy or gravity of the violation.""'
This approach to the imposition of fines upon hospitals
which have violated the antidumping laws establishes a more
rigid list of criteria upon which the amount of the fines shall
be determined than does the federal schema. To this extent, it
can be argued that the California system for levying fines is
108. Id. § 1317.6(c).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1988).
110. "Hospitals found by the state department to have committed, or to be re-
sponsible for, a violation of the provisions of this article or the regulations adopt-
ed hereunder, may each be fined by the state department in an amount not to
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for each hospital violation." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(a) (West Supp. 1989).
111. Id. § 1317.6(a)(1)(A).
112. Id. § 1317.6(a)(1)(B).
113. Id. § 1317.6(a)(1)(C).
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better than the federal system, for it enumerates specific cir-
cumstances which must be examined in determining the
amount of the penalty. Additionally, it should be noted that
under the California antidumping law fines may be imposed
on hospitals that negligently violate the law whereas the federal
legislation, as it now stands, imposes civil monetary penalties
only on hospitals that knowingly violate COBRA."' In this re-
spect, the California legislation is broader than the federal and,
arguably, because of the lesser standard of liability required,
will be more effective in deterring patient dumping. For these
reasons, COBRA should be amended so that civil monetary
penalties can be imposed on hospitals that negligently violate
the antidumping laws.
Furthermore, the California legislation addresses the prob-
lem of a hospital's double liability if said hospital is adjudged
to have violated both the federal and California statutes. To
this end, the California statute regarding the imposition of civil
fines upon hospitals which have violated the antidumping law
states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the state department
has primary responsibility for regulating the conduct of
hospital emergency rooms and that fines imposed under
this section should not be duplicated by additional fines
imposed by the federal government as a result of the con-
duct which constituted a violation of this section. To effec-
tuate the Legislature's intent, the Governor shall inform
the Secretary of the federal Department of Health and
Human Services of the enactment of this section' and re-
quest the federal department to credit any penalty assessed
under this section against any subsequent civil monetary
penalty assessed [by the federal government] ... for the
same violation" 1 5
Thus, California law provides that a California hospital
which is assessed a fine for violation of the state antidumping
statute may not be liable to the extent of the double liability of
a fine assessed by the federal government for the same act
which constitutes a violation of COBRA. Of course, the Cali-
fornia provision is not binding on the federal government" 6
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1988).
115. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13 17 .6 (a) (West Supp. 1989).
116. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United
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and it will be within the discretion of the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services whether or not to
also impose a federal fine.
(2) Physician's Liability for Civil Monetary
Penalties
Under California law, the board of medical quality assur-
ance shall have sole authority to impose a fine on a physician
found to have violated the legislation prohibiting patient
dumping. Furthermore:
Physicians found by the board to have committed, or to be
responsible for, a violation of this article ... are subject to
any and all penalties which the board may lawfully impose
and may be fined by the board in an amount not to ex-
ceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each violation."
7
The amount of a fine which could possibly be levied against an
offending physician in California is significantly less than the
$50,000 penalty which could be levied against the physician
under federal law. The federal fine of up to $50,000 will act as
a greater deterrent to patient dumping by physicians than will
the California fine of up to only $5,000.
The California legislature also clearly enumerated upon
what grounds the board of medical quality assurance could
levy fines against offending physicians. The legislature stated
that the board could impose a fine whenever it found that
"[t]he violation was knowing or willful,""18 that "[t]he viola-
tion was reasonably likely to result in a medical hazard, " "'
or that "[t]here are repeated violations. "1 0 Thus, unlike the
federal system, California law provides for the imposition of a
fine against a physician even if the physician did not knowingly
violate it. It is important to note that under the California
antidumping legislation any of the three criteria enumerated
above can result in an offending physician being fined. Thus,
for example, even if a physician did not "knowingly" or "will-
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme law of
the land.").
117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
118. Id. § 1317.6(a)(2)(A).
119. Id.
120. Id
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fully" violate the statute that physician could still be fined if
"[t]he violation was reasonably likely to result in a medical haz-
ard." " ' In this respect, the California legislation is, once
again, more far-reaching than the federal requirement of a
knowing violation of COBRA by a physician in order for a fine
to be levied. COBRA would benefit by an expansion of the
standard of liability for imposing fines against physicians to a
negligence standard. In this way, a greater number of physi-
cians would come under the auspices of COBRA, and greater
compliance with the federal antidumping law could be
achieved.
Finally, the legislation provides that the fines imposed on
offending physicians, for violations of California's antidumping
law, "shall not duplicate federal fines. "122 Thus an offending
physician who has been fined for that violation by the federal
government pursuant to the regulations promulgated under
COBRA will not be subject to the imposition of a fine by the
California board of medical quality assurance for the same
occurrence giving rise to the violation.
d) Private Civil Suits
The California legislation regarding private rights of ac-
tion is broader than that of the federal government in that the
California legislation allows any person harmed by a violation
of the antidumping laws to sue both the hospital and the phy-
sician or medical personnel responsible for the violation. Cali-
fornia law provides:
Any person who suffers personal harm and any medical
facility which suffers a financial loss as a result of a viola-
tion of this article or the regulations adopted hereunder
may recover in a civil action against the transferring hos-
pital or responsible administrative, or medical personnel,
damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other appropriate
relief. 2 '
Thus, similar to the federal regulations, California law
provides that any medical facility which is harmed by the viola-
tion may also bring an action to recover damages for the finan-
121. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(a)(2)(B).
122. Id. § 13 17 .6 (a)(2).
123. Id. § 1317.6(0.
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cial loss occasioned by the violation. Moreover, California law
provides that the "[t]ransferring hospitals from which inappro-
priate transfers of persons are made ... shall be liable for the
normal charges of the receiving hospital for providing the
emergency services and care which should have been provided
before transfer."
124
The California right of private action against a physician
who has violated the California antidumping provision seems
to be a good enforcement tool. This private cause of action
against an offending physician should also be included in the
federal law as embodied in COBRA. To that end, the author
proposes an amendment creating a private right of action
against physicians under COBRA.1
25
III. DEFINITIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE
ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION
The next section of this comment will address three
"definitional deficiencies" in the federal antidumping legisla-
tion: the definition of an "emergency medical condition," the
definition of "stable," and the definition of "transfer." In each
of these areas the strengths and weaknesses of the federal Act
will be compared to, and contrasted with, the California legis-
lation.
A. Definition of an "Emergency"
1. The Federal Approach
The federal antidumping legislation 16 defines an "emer-
gency medical condition" as a:
Medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that absence
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be ex-
pected to result in (i) placing the health of the individu-
al .. .in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ
124. Id.
125. This amendment can be found in the proposal section, section IV, of this
comment.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
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or part. 27
The aforementioned definition of an emergency has been
criticized by commentators. 28  One commentator1 29  has
suggested that the federal antidumping legislation should
adopt a broader definition of "emergency" such as the one
previously postulated by the American College of Emergency
Physicians (ACEP). s°
The definition of "emergency" adopted by ACEP includes:
(1) Any condition resulting in admission of the patient to
a hospital or nursing home within twenty-four hours;
(2) Evaluation or repair of acute (less than 72 hours)
trauma;
(3) Relief of acute or severe pain;
(4) Investigation or relief of acute infection;
(5) Protection of public health;
(6) Obstetrical crises and/or labor;
(7) Hemorrhage or threat of hemorrhage;
(8) Shock or impending shock;
(9) Investigation and management of suspected abuse or
neglect of person which, if not interrupted, could result in
temporary or permanent physical or psychological harm;
(10) Congenital defects or abnormalities in a newborn
infant best managed by prompt intervention;
(11) Decompensation or threat of decompensation of vital
functions, such as sensorism [sic], respiration, circulation,
excretion, mobility, or sensory organs;
(12) Management of a patient suspected to be suffering
from a mental illness and posing an apparent danger to
the safety of himself, herself, or others; or
(13) Any sudden and/or serious symptom(s) which might
indicate a condition which constitutes a threat to the
patient's physical or psychological well-being requiring
immediate medical attention to prevent possible deteriora-
tion, disability or death.' 3 '
127. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
128. See Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1210, noting that "neither
COBRA nor its legislative history provides adequate guidance for determining
when the risks to a patient's healh are 'serious.'"
129. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 9.
130. The current definition of "emergency" adopted by ACEP is the COBRA
definition. See Preventing Patient Dumping. supra note 9, at 1210 (footnote omitted).
131. Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 9, at 1211 (quoting ACEP Board
Reviews Definitions of Bona Fide Emergencies, ACEP1 News, Dec. 1982, at 1, col.
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It has been argued that this definition of emergency is
better than COBRA's definition for it provides those who are
subject to the provisions of COBRA with much clearer and
more illuminated guidelines.' In short, it eliminates the
guesswork.
It has been suggested that the absence of a clear definition
of "emergency" in the Hill-Burton Act-the federal
antidumping precursor to COBRA-was one of the reasons
that that act was ineffectual in stemming the tide of dumped
private hospital emergency department patients. 33 Following
on the heels of this assertion is the fear that COBRA's
antidumping provisions will be ineffective, and that COBRA
will not be enforced, because the term "emergency medical
condition" has not been adequately defined in the statute.
However, an examination of the cases decided under COBRA
indicates that the courts have no trouble interpreting or under-
standing the definition of "emergency medical condition" as
outlined in the federal statute. 3 5 Thus, it is the author's con-
tention that COBRA's definition of "emergency medical condi-
tion" is sufficiently clear to guide the conduct of those gov-
erned by the federal antidumping legislation.
2. The California Approach
The definition of an "emergency medical condition" un-
der California's antidumping legislation' 6 is as follows:
'Emergency medical condition' means a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate
132. See Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1211 ("The Department of
Health and Human Services should adopt this [the ACEP's] definition [of emer-
gency] for COBRA because it is clear and comprehensive. It will give better
guidance to the physicians and nurses who must comply with the anti-dumping
statute.").
133. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 0, at 1209-10 ("Lack of a pre-
cise definition of "emergency" has . . . been one of the main . . . weaknesses
of . . . the Hill-Burton Act . . ").
134. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 9, at 1209-10.
135. See, e.g., Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.
1990). In Deberiy the Court had no trouble finding that spinal meningitis constitut-
ed an emergency medical condition. See id. at 1305.
136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West Snpp. 1989).
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medical attention could reasonably be expected to result
in any of the following:
(1) Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy.
(2) Serious impairment to bodily functions.
(3) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.3 7
Furthermore, the California legislature has defined a
"medical hazard" as "a material deterioration in, or jeopardy
to, a patient's medical condition or expected chances for recov-
ery."1
3 8
Essentially the California statute defines "emergency" in
the same terms as the federal statute and therefore is, argu-
ably, susceptible to the same problems, i.e., lacking clear guide-
lines of what constitutes an emergency. However, if the federal
cases are any indication, the California courts should have little
difficulty in determining if certain factual situations meet the
legislature's definition of an emergency medical condition. In
other words, the California definition of emergency medical
condition is sufficient to provide health care workers with stan-
dard criteria for complying with the antidumping law, and is,
as well, sufficient to provide a court with a proper standard to
review whether a health care professional's activities are within,
or without, the parameters of the statute.
B. Definition of "Stable"
1. The Federal Approach
Federal antidumping legislation (as embodied in 42 U.S.C.
1395dd) provides:
The term 'to stabilize' means, with respect to an emergen-
cy medical condition . . . , to provide such medical treat-
ment of the condition as may be necessary to assure, with-
in reasonable medical probability, that no material deterio-
ration of the condition is likely to result from or occur
during the transfer of the individual from a facility.'
In addition, federal legislation states that "stabilized"
means that "[w]ith respect to an emergency medical condi-
tion ... no material deterioration of the condition is likely
137. Id. § 1317.1(b).
138. Id. § 1317.1(0.
139. 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (1988).
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within reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur
during the transfer of the individual from a facility." 4°
COBRA's definition of "stable" has been criticized as not estab-
lishing specifically enough what must be done to stabilize the
patient. 141
The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP),
in establishing guidelines for the transfer of patients, goes
much further than COBRA in defining "stable" and includes a
list of procedures which a health care provider should follow
in establishing stabilization prior to transfer.
According to ACEP, "stabilization includes adequate evalu-
ation and initiation of treatment to assure that transfer of a
patient will not, within reasonable medical probability, result in
death or loss or serious impairment of bodily functions, parts
or organs.
" 142
ACEP further states:
Evaluation and treatment of patients prior to transfer
should include the following:
(1) Establishing and assuring an adequate airway and
adequate ventilation;
(2) Initiating control of hemorrhage;
(3) Stabilizing and splinting the spine or fractures when
indicated;
(4) Establishing and maintaining adequate access routes
for fluid administration;
(5) Initiating adequate fluid and/or blood replacement;
and
(6) Determining that the patient's vital signs (including
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and urinary output, if
indicated) are sufficient to sustain adequate profusion. The
vital signs should remain within these parameters for a
sufficient time prior to transfer in order that the physician
may be reasonably certain that they will not deteriorate,
while the patient is en route to the receiving hospital.1
43
COBRA would benefit from an adoption of the ACEP
definition of "stable" and the ACEP guidelines propounded for
140. Id. § 1395dd(e)(4)(B).
141. See Preventing Patient Dumping; supra note 9, at 1212-13.
142. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1213 (citing Guidelines for
Transfer of Patients, ACEP, 14 ANNALS EMERG. MED. 1221, 1221 (1985)).
143. Preventing Patient Dumping supra note 9, at 1213 (citing Guidelines for
Transfer of Patients, ACEP, 14 ANNALS EMERG. MED. 1221, 1221 (1985)).
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effecting stabilization.
2. The California Approach
The California antidumping legislation does not define
"stable." This is a major shortcoming of the California regula-
tions and they should be amended to include a definition of
this term. Presumably, the definition of stable suggested by
ACEP would provide the best definition and as such, should
be adopted by the California legislature.
C. Definition of "Transfer"
1. The Federal Approach
It is erroneous and improper to state that COBRA prohib-
its the transfer of emergency department patients based on a
patient's inability to pay or for other nonmedical reasons.
Rather, COBRA provides that if a person comes to a hospital
emergency room, and that person is determined to have a
medical emergency,'44 then the hospital has the option of do-
ing one of two things; the hospital can either provide the nec-
essary medical treatment'45 or transfer the individual to anoth-
er health care facility. 146
If the hospital decides to follow the first course outlined
above and provides the necessary medical attention, then a
COBRA analysis terminates and any acts of negligence on the
part of the hospital or attending physicians will be determined
according to the forum state's medical malpractice laws. 147 If,
on the other hand, the hospital decides to transfer the patient
to another hospital, further specific requirements of COBRA
relating to the transfer of patients must be met.
First and foremost, COBRA requires as a general rule that
before a hospital transfers an individual with an emergency
medical condition, the hospital must stabilize the person's
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cld(b)(1) (1988).
145. See id. § 1395dd(b)(l)(A).
146. See id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B).
147. See, e.g., Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind.
1989) (holding that misdiagnosis, a traditional medical malpractice action, was
beyond the contemplated scope of COBRA); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Snpp. 433
(D. Kan. 1990). Cf Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'ji, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (failing to detect and diagnose an emergency medical condition is a viola-
tion of COBRA).
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condition.'48 If a patient has not been stabilized, as that term
is defined in COBRA, then the hospital may not undertake to
transfer the patient unless (1) a transfer is requested by the
individual or the individual's legal representative,'14  (2) a
qualified physician (or, if a physician is not. available in the
emergency department, some other qualified health care pro-
vider such as a nurse) has determined that the benefits of
transferring the patient to another medical facility outweigh
the risks to the patient in delaying treatment and effecting the
transfer, 150  or (3) "the transfer is an appropriate trans-
fer.,,'51
In order for a transfer to be appropriate, COBRA pro-
vides that the receiving hospital or medical facility must have
agreed to accept the patient and provide the required and
necessary treatment' 52 and that the receiving hospital have
space available for the patient and qualified personnel on hand
to provide care. 5 Furthermore, COBRA states that in order
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1988).
149. See id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i).
150. See id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).
151. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(B).
The complete text of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) is as follows:
(c) Restricting Transfers Until Individual Stabilized
(1) Rule
If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical con-
dition which has not been stabilized .. . the hospital may not trans-
fer the individual unless -
(A)(i) the individual (or a legally responsible person acting on
the individual's behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obliga-
tions under this section and of the risk of transfer, in writing re-
quests transfer to another medical facility.
(ii) a physician ... has signed a certification that based up.
on the information available at the time of transfer, the medical bene-
fits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate treatment
at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individ-
ual from effecting the transfer; or
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency
department at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medi-
cal personnel . . . has signed a certification described in clause (ii)
after a physician . . . in consultation with the person has made the
determination described in such clause, and subsequently countersigns
the certification; and
(B) the transfer is an appropriate transfer ... to that facility.
Id.
152. See id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)(ii).
153. See id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)(i).
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for a transfer to be appropriate the transferring hospital must
provide the receiving medical facility with the patient's medical
records concerning the transferring hospital's examination and
treatment of the patient, 154 and the transfer must be effectu-
ated by qualified medical personnel employing medically ap-
propriate standards of transfer.'55
COBRA defines "transfer" broadly as:
the movement (including the discharge) of an individual
outside a hospital's facilities at the discretion of any person
employed by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indi-
rectly, with) the hospital, but does not include such move-
ment of an individual who (A) has been declared dead, or
(B) leaves the facility without the permission of any such
person.1
5 6
154. See id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(C).
155. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(D).
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) regarding an appropriate transfer
reads as follows:
(2) Appropriate transfer
An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer
(A) in which the transferring hospital provides the medical
treatment within its capacity which minimizes the risks to the
individual's health and ....
(B) in which the receiving facility -
(i) has available space and qualified personnel for tile
treatment of the individual, and
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of. the
individual and to provide appropriate nedical treatment;
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving
facility all medical records (or copies thereof) related to tile emergen-
cy condition for which tile individual was presented, available at the
time of the transfer, including records related to the individual's
emergency medical condition, observations of signs or symptoms, pre-
liminary diagnosis, treatment provided, results of any tests and the
informed consent or certification ... provided under paragraph
(])(A), and tile name and address of any on-call physician . . . who
has refused or failed to appear within a reasonable time to provide
necessary stabilizing treatment.
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified person-
nel and transportation equipment, as required including the use of
necessary and medically appropriate life support measures during the
transfer; and
(E) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary [of
the Department of Health and Human Services] may find necessary in
the interest of health and safety of individuals transferred.
Id.
156. Id. § 1395dd(e)(4).
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The problem with the definition of "transfer" as stated in
COBRA is that it does not state explicitly what constitutes a
transfer. For example, under COBRA, the question arises
whether an "implicit transfer" would arise where a hospital
"shuts down" its emergency department to an incoming ambu-
lance and diverts the ambulance to another hospital. The ques-
tion of whether this would constitute an inappropriate transfer
and hence dumping, will be taken up in a later part of this
comment.
2. The California Approach
In enacting antidumping legislation, the California legisla-
ture adopted several clear conditions which must be met be-
fore a hospital can transfer a patient with an emergency medi-
cal condition for nonmedical reasons. Similar to the federal
antidumping legislation, as embodied in COBRA, California
antidumping legislation provides that an emergency care pa-
tient may not be transferred to another hospital for nonmedi-
cal reasons unless the patient has first been examined by a
competent physician,'57 the patient has been given the neces-
sary medical care in order to assure with reasonable probabili-
ty that the transfer will not cause a serious deterioration of the
patient's condition,15 8 and the transferring facility has ob-
tained the consent of the receiving facility to accept the patient
and provide the necessary care. 59 Furthermore, the receiving
hospital must have the space to accommodate the patient as
well as the appropriate personnel, equipment and services
157. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2(a) (West Supp. 1989) ("No
person needing emergency services and care may be transferred from a hospital
to another hospital for any nonmedical reason (such as the person's inability to
pay for any emergency service or care) unless ... (a) [tihe person is examined
and evaluated by a physician . . ").
158. See id. § 1317.2(b) ("No person needing emergency services and care.may
be transferred from a hospital to another hospital for any nonmedical reason ...
unless ... (b) [t]he person has been provided with emergency services and care
so that it can be determined, within reasonable medical probability, that the
transfer or delay caused by the transfer will not create a medical hazard to the
person.").
159. See id. § 1317.2(c) ("No person needing emergency services and care may
be transferred from a hospital to another hospital for any nonmedical reason ...
unless . . . (c) [a] physician at the transferring hospital has notified and has
obtained the consent to the transfer by a physician at the receiving hospi-
tal .... ").
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necessary for the patient's care.160
California also requires that the patient's medical records
accompany him or her to the receiving facility.' Thus far,
the California requirements with regard to an emergency pa-
tient transfer are substantially the same as the federal require-
ments as specified in COBRA. California, however, goes fur-
ther than the federal government in requiring a "transfer sum-
mary" to accompany the transferred patient's records. 6 2 The
federal legislation does not require a transfer summary, but
instead simply requires:
the transferring hospital send[] to the receiving facility all
medical records ... related to the emergency condition
for which the individual was presented, available at the
time of the transfer, including records related to the
individual's emergency medical condition, observations of
signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, treatment pro-
vided, results of any tests and the informcd written con-
sent or certification ... and the name and address of any
on-call physician ... who has refused or failed to appear
within a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing
treatment.
163
The California requirement of the transfer summary is
important in that it mandates that relevant information sur-
rounding the transfer be forwarded to the receiving facility.
The transfer summary contains such pertinent non-medical
information such as the "person's name, address, sex, race,
age, [and] insurance status." 64 Moreover, the transfer sum-
mary requires that the transferring physician sign the docu-
ment, and further requires that the summary contain:
the name and address of the transferring doctor or emer-
gency department personnel authorizing the transfer; the
time and date the person was first presented at the
transferring hospital; the name of the physician at the
receiving hospital consenting to the transfer, and the time
and date of the consent; the time and date of the transfer;
160. See id. § 1317.2(c).
161. See id. § 1317.2(e).
162. See id. § 1317.2(0.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(C) (1988).
164. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2(0 (West Supp. 1989).
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the reason for the transfer; and the declaration of the si-
gnor that the signor is assured, within reasonable medical
probability, that the transfer creates no medical hazard to
the patient.
165
One practical result of the California transfer summary is
that if litigation should arise as a result of the transfer, the
plaintiff-patient will have a single document readily at hand
identifying all the allegedly negligent parties. Also, the transfer-
ring doctor could use the transfer summary as a defense if the
circumstances show that said doctor was correct in his or her
conclusion that the transfer would create no medical hazard to
the patient.
A further result of the transfer summary is that both the
hospital and the California State Department will have accurate
records of patient transfers and data regarding said transfers.
In addition to requiring a hospital to develop transfer proto-
cols as a condition of licensure,' 66 California also requires
that "[a]ll hospitals ... maintain records of each transfer made
or received"'6 7 and that "all hospitals making or receiving
transfers . . .file with the state department annual reports ...
which ... describe the aggregate number of transfers made
and received according to the person's insurance status and rea-
sons for transfers."'
168
Furthermore, the California State Department is required:
on an annual basis [to] publish and provide to the legisla-
ture a statistical summary, by county, on the extent of
economic transfers of emergency patients, the frequency
of medically hazardous transfers, the insurance status of
the patient populations being transferred and all violations
finally determined by the State Department, describing the
nature of the violation, hospitals involved, and the action
taken by the State Department in response.'
The California requirements regarding the transfer sum-
mary, the keeping of adequate transfer records by the hospi-
165. Id.
166. See id. § 1317.3(a) ("As a condition of licensure, each hospital shall adopt,
in consultation with the medical staff, policies and transfer protocols consistent
with this article and regulations adopted hereunder.").
167. Id. § 1317.4(a).
168. Id. § 1317.4(b).
169. Id. § 1317. 4 (g).
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tals, and the requirement of reporting transfers to the State
Department will greatly aid the enforcement of the California
antidumping legislation. The omission of these requirements
in COBRA will make it more difficult to enforce the federal
legislation and to bring an action under COBRA.
For all of its strengths, the California antidumping legisla-
tion is weak because of the lack of an explicit definition of
"transfer." In fact, the California regulations contain no defini-
tion of "transfer." The weakness of this definitional omission is
that it is not clear whether regular hospital practices, such as
"shutting down" the emergency department to incoming am-
bulances, will constitute inappropriate transfers and hence
dumping. This problem will be addressed at greater length in
the next section of this comment.
3. Implicit Transfers
As already noted in this comment, neither the California
nor federal antidumping legislation adequately address the
problem of implicit transfer or "constructive dumping. 170
The Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act de-
fines "transfer" as "the movement (including the discharge) of
an individual outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of
any person employed by (or affiliated or associated, directly or
indirectly, with) the hospital .... ,', The California legisla-
tion does not define "transfer" in any manner other than by
stating what constitutes an "appropriate transfer."'
72
170. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 206.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(5) (1988).
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2 (West SUpp. 1989).
An "appropriate transfer" under California law is one in which all of tile
following conditions are met:
(a) The person is examined and evaluated by a physician, including if
necessary, consultation, prior to transfer.
(b) The person has been provided with emergency services and care
so that it can be determined within reasonable medical probability,
that the transfer or delay caused by the transfer will not create a
medical hazard to the person.
(c) A physician at the transferring hospital has notified and has ob-
tained the consent to the transfer by a physician at the receiving hos-
pital and confirmation by the receiving hospital that the person meets
the hospital's admissions criteria relating to appropriate bed, person-
nel and equipment necessary to treat the person.
(d) The transferring hospital provides for appropriate personnel and
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Thus, both federal and California legislation leave unan-
swered whether certain common hospital practices would vio-
late either or both. For instance, the question arises whether
the "shutting down" of a hospital's emergency room, with the
result that incoming ambulances are diverted to other hospi-
tals, would constitute dumping or improper transfer. As there
are no cases addressing this precise question, it is necessary to
analyze the statutes, law reviews, and legislative histories for an
answer.
In looking at the federal law first, it is clear that "[t]he
statutory definition of 'transfer' . . . covers events beyond
interhospital transfers. It extends to 'any movement' of a pa-
tient outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of any per-
son employed by or affiliated with the hospital."1 73 Thus, un-
der COBRA, "simply discharging [a] patient or removing the
patient from the hospital building"17'7 would constitute a
transfer. As a transfer within the meaning of the statute, if this
action were not taken in compliance with the rules promulgat-
ed under COBRA for effecting a patient transfer'75 then a
proper action for "dumping" would result.
Furthermore, a refusal to treat a patient in a hospital's
emergency room would be a violation of COBRA. 71 COBRA
equipment which a reasonable and prudent physician in the same or
similar locality exercising ordinary care would use to effect the trans-
fer.
(e) All the person's pertinent medical records and copies of all the
appropriate diagnostic test results which are reasonably available are
transferred with the person.
(0 The records transferred with the person include a 'Transfer
Summary' signed by the transferring physician which contains relevant
transfer information.
Id. § 1317.2(a)-(f).
173. Your Money or Your Life, supin note 4, at 205 (footnote omitted).
174. Your Money or Your Lfe, supra note 4, at 205.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1),(2) (1988).
176.
Under COBRA, dumping can also include simple refusals to treat,
regardless of whether a transfer has occurred. Specifically, refusal to
conduct the initial screening examination would constitute a violation
giving rise to a cause of action for harm caused by the refusal. Fur-
ther, if the person is in an emergency medical condition or active
labor and the hospital is unable or chooses not to transfer the per-
son, the hospital must provide medical treatment. Refusal to render
treatment to such a person would constitute dumping.
Your Money or Your Lfe, supra note 4, at 206.
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explicitly requires that, in hospitals with Emergency Depart-
ments, "if any individual ... comes to the emergency depart-
ment and a request is made ... for examination or treatment
for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an ap-
propriate medical screening examination within the capability
of the hospital's emergency department ... to determine
whether or not an emergency medical condition exists." 177
Thus, under COBRA, the hospital is required at least to
take the preliminary steps of conducting a medical examina-
tion to determine whether an emergency exists. If a medical
emergency does exist, then the hospital must either provide
treatment or appropriate transfer.
Similarly, it seems logical to assume that unreasonably
long delays in providing treatment to the emergency patient
would constitute dumping. COBRA requires that the hospital
provide an "appropriate medical screening examination" 178
and a strong and compelling argument can be made for the
notion that an "appropriate" medical screening examination
would be one which is undertaken in a prompt or reasonable
time.1 79
The question remains, however, whether COBRA would
apply to and impose liability on a hospital that had "shut
down" its emergency department and rerouted an incoming
ambulance to another hospital. It seems clear that under the
definition of transfer as embodied in COBRA,' this action
would constitute a transfer. According to COBRA, "transfer"
means "the movement.., of an individual outside a hospital's
facilities at the direction of any person employed by ... the
hospital."'' The act of rerouting the ambulance can easily be
seen as the "movement... of a patient outside a hospital's
facilities." Since the decision to "shut down" the emergency
department is generally made by a hospital administrator or
physician, this act clearly falls within the "direction of any per-
son employed by ... the hospital."
Although it seems clear that this action is a "transfer," that
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988).
178. Id.
179. For further arguments that "appropriate" means within a reasonable time,
see Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 206.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (1988).
181. Id. § 1395dd(e)(4).
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fact alone would not be sufficient to impose liability on the
hospital. As has already been noted, COBRA does not prohibit
the transfer of emergency patients, but rather requires that the
hospital must first stabilize the patient, and then effect the
transfer with "qualified personnel and transportation equip-
ment."
182
Furthermore, COBRA requires that the hospital "provide
for an appropriate medical examination within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department... to determine whether or
not an emergency medical condition... exists,"8' and if
"the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency
medical condition ... the hospital must provide ... within the
staff andfacilities available at the hospital, for such further medi-
cal examination and such treatment as may be required to
"84stabilize the medical condition, '  or for transfer.
Thus COBRA, within its statutory provisions, gives two
defenses to a hospital charged with dumping in the case of re-
routing an ambulance because the emergency department is
"shut down." First, the hospital must conduct the initial medi-
cal screening examination only "within the capability of the
hospital's emergency department."'185 According to one commen-
tator, "It is reasonable to evaluate the hospital's capability in
terms of available personnel."8 6 Furthermore, COBRA pro-
vides that a hospital must provide treatment for an emergency
patient only "within the staff and facilities available at the hos-
pital." '8 For these reasons, it can be concluded that a hospi-
tal which had "shut down" its emergency department, because
of inadequate staffing or lack of beds, would not violate CO-
BRA if that hospital rerouted an incoming ambulance to an-
other medical facility.
COBRA offers one further defense to the above named
situation of a hospital's rerouting an incoming ambulance to
another facility. COBRA provides that a hospital may transfer
a patient if "based upon the information available at the time
of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the
182. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(D).
183. Id. § 1395dd(a) (emphasis added).
184. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 1395dd(a) (emphasis added).
186. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 4, at 206.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical
facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual ... from
effecting the transfer."'88 Clearly, this cost/benefit analysis
would greatly add to a hospital's defense when charged with
patient dumping for rerouting an incoming ambulance. If the
hospital's emergency department is understaffed, the hospital
would be justified in believing that the benefits to the patient
in being transferred to another fully staffed emergency depart-
ment would outweigh the risks to the patient .engendered by
the transfer.
Of course, before a hospital that is understaffed may re-
route an incoming ambulance, the hospital must comply with
other aspects of COBRA, such as securing agreement from the
receiving facility to treat the patient,' and providing the pa-
tient with adequate transfer.90 Furthermore, the hospital
must shut down in good faith, and not merely because the
incoming ambulatory emergency room patient is indigent.
Under the California antidumping law, no liability would
accrue to a hospital that shuts down its emergency department
to an incoming ambulance transporting an emergency patient
so long as this shutting down occurs in good faith and because
of a lack of facilities or personnel and not merely because of
the patient's inability to pay for medical services. From a read-
ing of the California antidumping statutes, it appears that a
good faith shutting down of the emergency department would
not subject the hospital to liability because, like COBRA, Cali-
fornia requires that the hospital provide treatment only "within
the capability of the facility."'' Thus, it would not be within
the hospital's capability to accept an incoming emergency pa-
188. Id. § 1395dd(c)(I)(A)(ii).
189. Section 1395dd(c)(2)(B)(ii) provides that an a)propriate transfer to a
medical facility is a transfer-
(B) in which the receiving facility-
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide
appropriate medical treatment.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B)(ii).
190. Section 1395dd(c)(2)(B)(ii) provides that an appropriate transfer to a
medical facility is a transfer-
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and
transportation equipment, as required, including the use of necessary
and medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(D).
191. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.1(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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tient when the hospital is understaffed, or already overflowing
with patients.
However, under California law, before the ambulance can
be rerouted certain other requirements must be met if the
hospital is to escape liability. First, it must "be determined
within reasonable medical probability, that the transfer, or
delay caused by the transfer will not create a medical hazard to
the patient."'92 Thus if the incoming ambulance were carry-
ing a cardiac arrest patient and the rerouting would cause a
delay in the patient's receiving treatment, the transferring
hospital would be under a duty to accept that patient and at
least stabilize him or her before a transfer could be effected.
Additionally, before a rerouting of an incoming ambulance can
occur, the hospital must notify the receiving hospital and "ob-
tain[] the consent to the transfer by a physician at the receiv-
ing hospital [as well as] confirmation by the receiving hospital
that the person meets the hospital's admissions criteria relating
to appropriate bed, personnel, and equipment necessary to
treat the person."'93 If the above enumerated criteria are
met, then under California law, liability will not be imposed
upon a hospital that reroutes an incoming ambulance because
of a good faith "shut down" of the hospital's emergency de-
partment.
IV. PROPOSAL
Several changes should be made to COBRA. These chang-
es include amendments that would (1) require a finding of
repeated, willful or knowing violations of COBRA before a
hospital could lose its Medicare provider agreement, (2) lessen
the standard for the imposition of fines against hospitals and
doctors to a negligence standard, and (3) allow a private right
of action against physicians. These proposals will be discussed
below.
A. Termination of Medicare Provider Agreement
The author would suggest that Congress amend the en-
forcement provisions of COBRA so that revocation of a
192. Id. § 1317.2(b).
193. Id. § 1317.2(c).
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hospital's Medicare provider agreement would be predicated
only upon repeated knowing or intentional violations and not
upon the lesser standard of negligence which is all that the
statute now requires. The effect of such an amendment would
be to preserve the sanction of revocation of the Medicare pro-
vider agreement only for hospitals that have egregiously and
wantonly disregarded the antidumping provisions of COBRA
over an extended period of time. The amended enforcement
provision of COBRA, with respect to revocation of the
hospital's Medicare provider agreement, would thus read:
(d) ENFORCEMENT. -
(1) AS REQUIREMENT OF MEDICARE PROVIDER
AGREEMENT. - If a hospital, on a repeated basis, know-
ingly or willfully fails to meet the requirements of this
section, such hospital is subject to -
(A) termination of its Medicare provider agree-
ment, or
(B) at the option of the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, suspension of
such Agreement for such period of time as the Secretary
determines to be appropriate, upon reasonable notice to
the hospital and to the public.
B. Imposition of Civil Monetary Fines Against Physicians and
Hospitals
COBRA's provision of civil monetary fines against physi-
cians and hospitals that violate the federal antidumping laws
will, in the opinion of the author, prove to be a very effective
way of ensuring compliance with the legislation. However, as
the law now stands, civil monetary penalties can be imposed
only on hospitals and physicians Who knowingly violate CO-
BRA. It would make greater sense in achieving the congressio-
nal purpose behind the enactment of COBRA-ensuring that
the indigent and uninsured receive adequate emergency medi-
cal care-to also allow civil monetary fines to be imposed for
negligent violations. Thus, the author suggests the following
amendment to COBRA's enforcement provisions which would
lessen the standard upon which a civil monetary fine could be
imposed upon a hospital or physician to a negligence standard.
CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES. -
(A) A participating hospital that knowingly, or negli-
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gently, violates a requirement of this section is subject to a
civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 for each
such violation.
(B) Any physician who is responsible for the exami-
nation, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a partici-
pating hospital including a physician on-call for the care of
such an individual, and who negligently or knowingly vio-
lates a requirement of this section is subject to a civil mon-
etary penalty of not more than $50,000. However, this
section shall not apply to any emergency department phy-
sician who authorizes the transfer of an individual based
on the failure or refusal of an on-call physician to treat the
individual, and based on the reasonable determination by
the emergency department physician that the benefits to
the individual from the transfer outweigh the risks of
transfer.
C. Private Right of Action Against Physicians
One major area in which the California antidumping legis-
lation clearly exceeds COBRA in providing remedies for those
persons who suffer harm as a result of a physician's violation
of the antidumping laws is in the area of civil actions against
physicians. At this time, COBRA does not provide for a private
cause of action against a physician; instead, it provides only for
civil actions against hospitals. An amendment to COBRA ex-
tending the right to bring a civil action against physicians,
similar to that provided for under the California antidumping
legislation, would undoubtedly compel greater compliance with
COBRA's requirements by emergency room physicians, and
those physicians on-call at hospital emergency departments.
Such an amendment would read as follows:
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
(B) PERSONAL HARM: LIABILITY OF PHYSI-
CIANS. - Any individual who suffers a personal harm as a
direct result of an emergency department physician's, or
an on-call physician's, negligent violation of any require-
ment of this section may, in a civil action against the physi-
cian, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the state in which the violation occurred,
and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
A physician's liability under this private right of action
enforcement arm of COBRA would be predicated on a negli-
1991]
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gence standard, and not the standard of strict liability upon
which a hospital's liability in a civil action is based.' A negli-
gence standard of liability will insure greater physician com-
pliance with COBRA's requirements and allow recovery by
injured persons against noncomplying physicians, while insu-
lating non-negligent physicians from strict liability for a trans-
ferred individual's damages.
V. CONCLUSION
The practice of dumping emergency department patients
because of their indigency or lack of insurance is abhorrent.
However, it is also unfair and unrealistic, considering the costs
and expenses of health care in the United States at the present
time, to mandate that private hospitals provide treatment to all
persons regardless of their ability to pay. It is between these
two competing interests-the interest of the indigent in receiv-
ing emergency medical care and the interest of the private
hospital in remaining solvent and profitable-that the federal
and California antidumping legislation attempt to strike a bal-
ance. For the most part, the two statutes are successful in en-
suring that the indigent will receive medical care in true emer-
gency situations, and that private hospitals will not be forced
to absorb the total cost of providing indigent care. However,
as this comment has illustrated, there are still several aspects of
the antidumping laws in which a greater balance between the
interests of the indigent emergency department patient and
the private hospital can be achieved. The purpose of this com-
ment was to highlight potentially problematic aspects of Cali-
fornia and federal antidumping legislation, and to propose
ways to strengthen them while maintaining the delicate balance
of the interests of the indigent emergency department patient
against those of the private hospital.
John Patrick Halfpenny
194. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the strict
liability standard in private civil actions brought against hospitals for COBRA
violations.
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